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Productivity Measures in 
Collective Bargaining 
Solomon Barkin 
The author examines the questions whether the measurement 
of productivity is a significant issue in collective bargaining and 
whether productivity is a primary déterminant ofthe levels ofear-
nings. 
Physical productivity is only one dimension of the économie problems 
confronting the parties at the bargaining table. In fact in most instances it 
enters into the discussion only indirectly as they consider the rationalities 
for settling individual issues. Both parties are engaged in business or em-
ployment for the purpose of securing effective pecuniary results. Improve-
ments in physical productivity are only one means for attaining thèse 
results. Business has always been aware of thèse facts and organized their 
opérations and transactions to improve their "bottom Une" readings. Ways 
of achieving thèse ends may be varied. They may relate to effective pur-
chasing of materials, processing, use of materials, and forms of input, sel-
ling, compétition as to product, distribution and price and also financial 
transactions. The latter hâve become particularly important in récent years 
as corporate leaders hâve exploited tax laws for advancing the company's 
financial positions. Some transactions are consummated primarily for the 
purpose of financial gain rather than advanced productive effort. An illus-
tration of their importance is offered us by the récent restrictions imposed 
by the Fédéral Reserve Bank on loans to interests seeking financial control 
of new enterprises through mergers or other devices which do not advance 
our national productive effort. 
Employées in our pecuniary world are well aware that the ultimate pay 
off for their efforts, skills and knowledge are their earnings and in récent 
years, their real purchasing power. This préoccupation with their own 
returns of course explains much employée conduct within the productive 
process. Their aim is to maximize their earnings. They master the rules and 
ways to do so and pursue them. They become early aware that the so-called 
wage bargain is composed of three separate dimensions, time, effort and/or 
leisure and skill or knowledge. The parties bargain either in a formai or in-
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formai manner or through an ability to affect actual practice to détermine 
each of thèse éléments or the total combination. The relationships of the 
shares are likely to vary from bargain to bargain. Most of the agreements 
relate to spécifie jobs while other standards relate to an entire work place or 
even to wider areas. 
Similar bargaining goes on with respect to the executive, managerial 
and professional employées. The rewards and terms of employment are 
contained in a multiphased package of benefits, many of which are some-
what remote from actual direct output. 
It is therefore not surprising that management and employée interests 
do not fully coincide. Production profits and physical output are not neces-
sarily the exclusive déterminants of the figures on the "bottom line". Em-
ployées think of many dimensions of their package of rewards or terms of 
employment which are not necessarily of uppermost concern to top man-
agement. Profits can be achieved by means other than direct physical out-
put and employée rewards can be granted on items not central to the cost 
bargain. 
Another factor which must be observed is the time dimension. Mea-
surements are made and discussions carried on as if the appropriate mea-
sure is the immédiate effect. Short term gauges dominate in the discussion. 
Quarterly and annual financial statements are the main déterminants in 
much of management thinking. Measures for controlling middle manage-
ment performance are formulated most often for such near-term time 
spans. But in our world of intense rates of product technical, market and 
compétitive change, programs and measures should be evaluated for their 
médium and long-term conséquences. Similarly employée results cannot be 
judged exclusively by their immédiate effects. Médium and long-term im-
pacts are offen of even more importance. The récent volume of adverse fin-
dings of the long-term health effects of some chemicals hâve made this con-
sidération most poignant. Similarly in a more positive vein, one dimension 
of the job is the prospects it offers an employée for the future. It brings to 
mind the fundamental bias introduced into the American mass production 
system by the high fractionalization of work and the recruitment of unskil-
led peole for semi-skilled routine jobs. They hâve largely been dead-end em-
ployments. Contrast this arrangement with the procédure introduced in the 
FIAT plants in Italy requiring semi-skilled workers to acquire a full range of 
skills, entitling them to the appellation and the benefits of an ail-round skil-
led automobile mechanic. The job benefit package is very différent for the 
American routinized semi-skilled worker and the Italian ail-round auto-
mobile mechanic. 
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 363 
Both parties evaluate jobs and returns from différent approaches. 
Management does not limit itself in its évaluation of the enterprise to the 
physical production aspects. Its interests are broad and ultimately pecuniary 
in character. The "bottom line" figure also can be calculated in terms of 
différent time spans. Productivity measures are very incidental to the em-
ployée's appraisal of his employment. His pay package consists of three élé-
ments, pay, effort or leisure and knowledge and skill. He too will consider 
each in terms of différent time spans. 
JOB STANDARDS 
The diversity of approaches is the source of many of the actual difficul-
ties encountered in trying to find a place for productivity measures in bar-
gaining. The first and most common effort was to use production standards 
for testing employée's performance. Incentive Systems either in the form of 
pièce rates or wage incentive Systems are a second form. Both hâve ultimate-
ly one élément in common. They are not truly indexes of physical produc-
tivity. They define levels of human application. Production standards re-
flect the man's application. Time study techniques are organized to provide 
such measures reflecting a universal norm of such application for ail em-
ployées. 
The common procédure has been to reassess the level of application 
whenever changes occur on the job. Management invariably seeks to recap-
ture the output for which no additional application was required. This con-
dition was usually referred to as "loose" rates. Contrariwise, employées 
seek some relaxation of "tight" rates. Productivity is not central to the em-
ployee's rewards; it is the level of application. "Loosenesses" and "tight-
nesses" in the rates develop regularly through changes in raw materials, 
operating conditions, job arrangements and product. Efforts by manage-
ment to recapture higher output not attributable to employée application is 
a constant source of friction in plants. Similarly employée grievances about 
tight rates fill the channels of the bargaining mechanisms. Usually thèse 
contests hâve become so disturbing that both management and unions hâve 
agreed to moderate the pace at which rates are revised limiting them to cases 
where the overall réduction of the level of application exceeds five percent 
of the work time at the job. But the costs of monitoring such Systems 
become so burdensome that the task tends to be neglected particularly dur-
ing prosperous periods. The resuit is that the changes when finally proposed 
constitute major altérations in jobs and may provoke serious contests. In-
dustrial engineering consultants invariably hâve stressed the necessity of 
constant monitoring of wage incentive Systems and hâve faulted manage-
ments for not diligently discharging this responsibility. But thèse remon-
strances hâve not significantly affected actual practice. 
364 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 36. NO 2 (1981) 
As the rates of change in operating conditions increase, managements 
hâve followed one of two courses. One was to abandon the older wage in-
centive System through wholesale revision or the substitution of a new one. 
The second is to introduce a time rate System. As a resuit the proportion of 
employées covered by such incentive Systems has declined for the country as 
a whole. In some industries they hâve been entirely abandoned without 
noticeable affect on levels of human application. One aspect of such revi-
sions which needs to be mentioned is the common practice to reward em-
ployées with buy out bonuses to win their support for the introduction of 
the newer incentive arrangement or a time rate System. The important fact 
to stress is that thèse Systems did not measure productivity in the sensé of 
total output. They concentrated on strandardizing levels of human applica-
tion and depriving employées of the benefits of higher output. 
Technical and other changes wrecked many fixed physical production 
standards as well as wage incentive Systems. Despite the fact that few writers 
speak directly of same, the American industrial scène is strewn with the 
wreckage of wage incentive plans. 
GROUP GAIN SHARING SYSTEMS 
A variety of wage schemes hâve been devised to encourage employée 
interest in advancing and contributing to higher physical productivity. But 
they hâve been much less successful than the preceding efforts. The group 
gain sharing Systems reward employées for their coopération and ideas to 
advance productivity to the degree that they lower costs, particularly labor. 
Suggestion plans are of course the simplest in thèse catégories. They provide 
individuals and sometimes groups rewards for spécifie suggestions. 
Far more interesting are the group or plant productivity Systems. They 
seek to promote productivity. The more commonly known ones are referred 
to as the Kaiser Steel, Rucker and Scanlon plans. The last is particularly in-
teresting because it originated with an officiai of the United Steel Workers 
Union who sought ways to enlist union member coopération to rescue com-
panies from financial collapse. To achieve higher efficiency, the plans rest 
on the close collaboration and participation of union members in the pro-
grams. In récent years the plans were introduced in unorganized shops. The 
plan dépends on tapping employée proposais for improving output and sav-
ing raw materials, space, time and personnel. They start with an assurance 
to employées that their jobs will be guaranteed and no employée will be 
adversely affected by the program. 
Lacking an overall method of calculating improvements in productivi-
ty, the plans uniformaly rely on a ratio of labor costs to value added or sales 
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value. Being restricted primarily to manufacturing enterprises, the concept 
superficially possessed the lure of simplicity and facility in calculations. But 
in practice many problems appeared both of an accounting and technical 
nature which diminished the possibility of précise measurement. In time 
historical data became increasingly irrelevant to new conditions. Adjust-
ments disturbed the logic of the relationships. The problems became so dis-
turbing that administrators considered revamping the formula which 
planted seeds of suspicion and controversy. As a resuit few such plans hâve 
had impressive life spans. They tended to flourish during periods when they 
netted high bonuses and languished and ultimately disappeared with the 
sharp réductions of the bonus, particularly in periods of adverse business 
conditions. Internai plant conflicts between employées and management 
brought about the early démise of some plans. 
Some unfortunate expériences hâve been recorded in plans which used 
irrelevant measures to gauge performance or économie expérience. One of 
the earlier ones was that instituted by the unions and the Fall River Cotton 
Manufacturers Association in 1905. They employed the print cloth mill 
margin (cloth priées minus cost of raw cotton) as the measure. Unfortunate-
ly about two-thirds of the output for the area was on fancy fabrics which 
had more generous mill margins. Weekly adjustments with occasional 
réductions proved most unstabilizing and provoked strikes. Later adjust-
ments were made semi-annually which reduced the rate of strikes. The plan 
was finally abandoned and no such formula was tried again. Among addi-
tional difficulties with this calculation was the fact that the price of raw cot-
ton was in those years affected by unpredictable spéculative influences 
developing on the international cotton market and mill margins were actual-
ly not a measure of profitability since the latter are considerably affected by 
the volume of production. 
NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE 
The difficulties of developing easy and durable measures of productivi-
ty for the individual enterprises led inevitably to the search for another ap-
proach to defining employée entitlements to shares in higher productivity. 
In the latter thirties and forties in this country the trade unions had argued 
strongly that employées should benefit from advances in American efficien-
cy. Public arguments to this effect were repeatedly made. It became the 
common lore that such participation in the benefits was essential to win em-
ployées over to the acceptance of changes for higher productivity. Tradi-
tional résistance to innovation was widespread though not effective. One of 
the advantages of the steps taken to measure such advances was they pro-
vided a direct mathematical expression for the rate of gains in productivity. 
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During the discussion on criteria for wage adjustment at the War Labor 
Board of World War II, this considération was actively propounded. After 
the war the issue was again strongly pressed. 
The resuit was the 1948 historié agreement between the UAW and the 
General Motors Company which established the principle that employées 
were entitled to an annual increase of three percent in their wages to reflect 
the rise in national productivity and cost of living adjustments. Employées 
were therefore guaranteed that their real earnings would be improved by the 
above sum. The attraction of this gênerai rule was that it avoided the diffi-
culties of calculating such indexes for the individual enterprises or indus-
tries. It had become apparent that the available date, for the latter purpose 
were really déficient. Statistical information respecting output did not 
usually coincide with the coverage of manhour data. The industrial output 
per manhour calculation was therefore questionable if not fictitious. Fig-
ures which appeared useful as indicators of direction and rate of change 
would not stand up as évidence of the actual degrees of improvement or 
change in manhour output. While the overall national output figures suf-
fered from many deficiencies, at least it was hoped they would cancel them-
selves or at least not distort the final results. 
With the acceptance of the above formula in the General Motors Com-
pany, the other automobile companies followed suit. While few other com-
panies or industries adopted the spécifie formula the logic for its support 
for comparable improvements in real earnings became part of the accepted 
premises of the American wage System. The principles were later adopted in 
the guideposts for wage increases under the System of restraint promulgated 
by the 1962 Council of Economie Advisors. In 1971 the Pay Board rein-
forced the use of the principle by sanctioning a total wage package of 5.5 
percent which included both the three percent annual improvement factor 
and the 2.5 percent established rise in consumer priées. The current agree-
ment for the steel industry continues this same provision. 
During the above period, it appeared most important that the Ameri-
can workforce be persuaded that higher productivity was a positive phe-
nomenon and would redound to the benefit of the American working popu-
lation. Résistance to technical and other changes was self-defeating. It 
would destroy the base from which flowed the distinctive benefits enjoyed 
by the American employée. His higher standard of living was based, it was 
argued, on higher productivity. Whatever doubts lingered were subor-
dinated by the positive expérience during World War II when the United 
States became the "arsenal for the world democracies". High efficiency 
and productivity made it possible to win the war. American industrial 
leadership accepted the principle of awarding employées generally for thèse 
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improvements in the total economy. European industry followed a similar 
course, awarding employées with increases in real earnings. 
ENDURING POLICY PROBLEMS 
But the above developments hardly allow for many of the basic choices 
arising in the opération of the plans. A common issue is how to treat im-
provements in productivity in individual industries or opérations. How shall 
the rewards for productivity be distributed? Shall they be awarded on a na-
tional basis across the board to ail employées in ail industries irrespective of 
the spécifie record of improvements? This principle is followed in Sweden. 
The national wage agreement is applied to ail industries irrespective of the 
individual industry's or enterprise's ability to shoulder the cost. Those 
which are adversely affected it is argued should improve their performance, 
contract or pass out of existence. Displaced employées would be absorbed 
by other enterprises in a virile economy and assisted by an effective national 
manpower adjustment System. 
In the United States, on the other hand, wage adjustments are made se-
lectively by individual enterprises and many of them do not follow national 
patterns. Since the end of World War II, déviations from this pattern hâve 
actually increased, with the larger companies foliowing the model set by the 
automobile and steel industry contracts. In thèse instances spécifie job 
operational sharing Systems are therefore either entirely absent or of minor 
importance. Measures for gauging précise advances in productivity hâve 
become generally irrelevant in wage negotiations except as they may be use 
as part of the gênerai discussions of the rationale for gênerai wage formulae 
offered by either party. 
A second problem arises where management seeks to eliminate what it 
considers to be costly and unproductive practices. Référence has already 
been made to methods of handling the loose rates under wage incentive 
plans. Similar approaches are employed by management when it seeks to 
cancel out established or negotiated work arrangements which hâve become 
unduly costly. Managements particularly where union bargaining strength 
is well established, offer "buyouts", "buybacks" or "give backs", to win 
employée and union consent to new assignments. A similar arrangement is 
provided by the British productivity agreements. 
A third one which has become particularly significant in récent years 
arises where companies threaten to close plants. Managements in such cases 
may offer to maintain plant opérations if concessions are made by employ-
ées on wages and work practices which burden production costs. Often 
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thèse are granted by employées including those who might hâve been resist-
ing such changes in former years. In a desperate effort to hold on to their 
jobs even for short periods they become willing to offer relief from high 
compétitive costs. But in thèse instances no exact measurements of produc-
tivity are usually used. The resolution dépends upon the employées' willing-
ness to concède thèse changes after they hâve accepted the conclusion that 
the survival of the plant or opération is truly at stake. 
A fourth problem occurs where major changes are likely to cause sig-
nificant employée displacements. Many agreements provide for employée 
adjustment programs designed either to prevent or limit the volume of dis-
placement. They may call for the use of attrition or employée transfer, ces-
sation of new hirings while displaced persons are available, retraining, relo-
cation and finally financial compensation such as early retiremenl; or sépa-
ration pay. 
Finally, the récent décline in the overall increase in the rate of advance 
of productivity raises even more serious questions. Are we facing a secular 
décline in the rate of increase of productivity from three percent to a lower 
rate? While the rate for manufacturing industries has been maintained mea-
sures suggest a drop in other industries. Hère we are truly confronted by the 
inadequacies of tools for measurement, as is évident in the service and con-
struction industries. The available measures indicate a décline in the rate of 
increase, whereas calculations for the individual branches of the industry in-
variably report a rise in productivity. We are only in the initial stages of our 
effort to reassess the assumptions and techniques for calculation but it is 
certain that the présent methodology is both déficient and is possibly pro-
ducing misleading results. Nevertheless, with levels of business activity 
dropping and profits in many industries declining and rates of opération of 
capacity being lowered, the issue will be raised in collective agreements as to 
whether the three percent rate fixed for overall increases in rates of produc-
tivity is realistic. For the time being agreements continue to use thèse figures 
but in time we shall hâve to consider this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
By and large the measurement of productivity has not loomed as a sig-
nificant issue in bargaining. Productivity is not the primary déterminant of 
the levels of earnings. The negotiators resort to broad gauges of change or 
finally accept the conclusion that thèse plans and tools will be shortlived. 
Wage incentive Systems are concerned with levels of human application and 
not productivity. Formai plant-wide gain sharing Systems suffer from the 
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inadequacies of the measures employed or from their insensitivity to chang-
ing business fortunes. When the gains are minimal or non-existent they 
usually collapse. "Buyouts" hâve been employed to win employée coopéra-
tion in the élimination of spécifie past practices managements find unduly 
costly. Where wholesale technical or économie changes cause large scale 
displacement some programs for the displaced seek to minimize the num-
bers so affected and provide aids for facilitating their adjustment to new 
employments or withdrawal from the labor market. 
Les mesures de productivité et la négociation collective 
La productivité physique n'est que l'une des dimensions auxquelles les parties 
doivent faire face à la table des négociations collectives. L'une et l'autre sont enga-
gées dans ce processus afin de protéger des intérêts d'ordre financier. Les mesures de 
productivité ne sont donc qu'un des moyens d'obtenir les résultats recherchés. 
Les employeurs en ont toujours été conscients qu'il s'agisse pour eux de l'achat 
des matières premières, de l'aménagement de la production, de l'utilisation des 
biens, de l'organisation des ventes, de la fixation des prix, de la concurrence ou des 
transactions purement financières. De leur côté, les salariés sont aussi conscients que 
le but ultime de leurs efforts consiste à l'accroissement de leurs gains et, depuis quel-
ques années, au maintien de leur pouvoir d'achat. Cette préoccupation explique 
leurs attitudes. En conséquence, les intérêts des employeurs et des salariés ne coïnci-
dent pas. 
Par ailleurs, les systèmes de rémunération au rendement, qu'ils soient indivi-
duels ou collectifs, ne peuvent pas être considérés comme de véritables indices de 
productivité physique. Ils ne tendent qu'à stimuler la production. Quand ils ne don-
nent pas satisfaction, on les remplace par d'autres ou on les supprime tout simple-
ment. Ainsi, la proportion des salariés assujettis aux systèmes de rémunération au 
rendement a-t-elle diminué et, dans quelques industries, les a-t-on carrément mis au 
rancart. 
La difficulté de mettre au point des mesures de productivité simples et stables 
dans les entreprises considérées individuellement a conduit à la recherche d'autres 
moyens visant à permettre aux salariés d'avoir leur part de la hausse de la produc-
tivité. 
En 1948, intervient l'accord historique entre le syndicat des travailleurs de l'au-
tomobile et la société General Motors qui établit le principe selon lequel les salariés 
bénéficieraient d'une augmentation annuelle de trois pour cent, hausse représentant 
à la fois l'accroissement de la productivité générale à travers le pays et le coût de l'in-
flation. Cette formule avait l'avantage d'éviter les difficultés de calcul de tels indices 
pour les entreprises individuelles. Le principe se généralisa peu à peu et, au cours des 
décennies 1950 à 1970, on y eut recours pour établir des lignes directives générales qui 
s'appliquaient à l'ensemble de l'économie américaine. Durant cette période, il appa-
raissait important que la main-d'oeuvre soit persuadée qu'une productivité plus forte 
était un phénomène positif dont elle bénéficierait, car c'était là-dessus que se fondait 
l'amélioration du niveau de vie. 
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L'application de ce principe s'est heurtée à plusieurs problèmes: rajustement des 
salaires effectués par entreprise individuelle et sans suivre de normes, nécessité pour 
certains employeurs d'éliminer des pratiques improductives et trop coûteuses, obli-
gation parfois de fermer les usines, déplacement d'un nombre important de travail-
leurs. 
On peut donc conclure que les mesures de productivité ne sont pas apparues 
comme un enjeu véritable de la négociation et que la productivité n'est pas ce qui 
détermine d'abord le niveau des gains. Les négociateurs s'en tiennent à des indica-
teurs vagues et les régimes d'intéressement souffrent des imperfections des mesures 
utilisées. On a recours à diverses méthodes pour obtenir la coopération des employés 
en vue de l'élimination des pratiques trop coûteuses. Lorsque des changements tech-
nologiques et économiques sont la cause de déplacement de main-d'oeuvre, on met 
au point des programmes destinés à diminuer le nombre de ceux qui sont touchés et à 
leur fournir de l'aide pour favoriser leur recyclage ou les inciter à se retirer du marché 
du travail. 
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